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“Der Sinn des Krieges” 
Politische Ziele und militärische Instrumente der kriegf ührenden Parteien von 
1914-1918 
This conference, which took place between Thursday 21 and Saturday 23 March 2013 at the 
Historisches Kolleg in Munich, brought together a selection of internationally renowned scholars 
to discuss the war aims and strategies of many of the belligerent nations during the First World 
War. The conference was organized by Holger Afflerbach (Leeds) and Elisabeth Hüls (Historisches 
Kolleg). Through a series of chaired discussions and keynote addresses the conference sought to 
draw together the separate, national approaches to the consideration of war aims, and create a 
forum in which a more comparative, international, collaborative discussion of the topic could 
take place. As noted by Afflerbach in his introduction to the conference, the questions 
surrounding war aims and strategies are myriad and complex, whilst the aims and strategies 
themselves were subject to change as the war developed. Internal and external pressures, 
combined with the magnitude of events, produced a conflagration of previously unimagined 
scale and duration. The conference sought to examine the responses offered by politicians and 
military personnel alike to some of these key questions: how were coherent strategies developed 
by the belligerents? What actions did the political and military elites take in order to establish a 
consensus of national opinion? What were the political leaders actually able to do as events 
continued to unfold, both before and during the war? What alternative strategies were available 
to them? And finally, why did the war continue for as long as it did? Why didn’t it stop? 
It was with these questions in mind that the first panel of the conference took place, with 
Georges-Henri Soutou (Sorbonne) and Keith Jeffery (Queen’s, Belfast) examining France and 
Britain respectively. For Soutou, the military plans created by Joffre in the immediate pre-war 
period were not merely a reflection of the ‘offensive cult’ gripping military commanders of the 
time, but a response to the ambitious political aims of the French state. Alongside the 
reclamation of Alsace-Lorraine, France aimed for the separation of the industrial Saar region and 
the Rhineland from German influence, in conjunction with similar Russian aims in the east. These 
goals, to diminish German economic power and develop French industrial potential, were 
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intrinsically linked to French military strategy in the early years of the war, a strategy which 
advocated successive attempts to ‘break through’ the German lines and secure the decisive 
victory on the battlefield. When this did not occur – the Nivelle offensive of 1917 being the final 
attempt – the army slipped into mutiny and the military strategy passed from the offensive to 
the defensive; wait for the Americans and the tanks, and attempt to gain a negotiated peace with 
Vienna to isolate Germany. In conjunction with the collapse of the Russian war effort, this saw a 
shift in French political considerations away from the pre-war entente with Russia and towards, 
in 1918, an ‘Atlantic alliance’ with Britain and the United States. 
Jeffery also considered the issue of alliance in his paper – this time between the British 
government and the Dominions – with a discussion upon the developing influence of imperial 
interests over British war aims. Although, as Jeffery noted, the break-up of the British Empire has 
led to the promotion of ‘nationalized’ narratives of the British war effort – the emphasis upon 
the role of ANZAC troops at Gallipoli despite the larger numbers of English troops a notable 
example – the most significant pre-war discussion over Britain’s war strategy was a purely British 
affair. At the CID meeting in August 1911, the Dominions were not invited and not made aware 
of the conclusions of the meeting, Britain’s continental commitment to the despatch of the BEF 
to France. In 1914 the Dominions were again reduced to the role of spectators, one that 
continued until the appointment of an Imperial War Cabinet by Lloyd George in 1917. Echoing 
the earlier discussion, Jeffery demonstrated that developments during the war led to a change 
in British considerations. As the French had become increasingly ‘Atlantic’ in their focus as the 
conflict continued, the British outlook became more imperial as the war went on and the 
manpower of the Dominions became more and more important. The final outcome of this policy 
would be the representation of the Dominions both as part of the British Empire, and as ‘small 
powers’ in their own right at Versailles. 
Hew Strachan’s (Oxford) keynote speech, which followed, concentrated upon the relationships 
between the politicians and military leaders responsible for creating the aims and strategies for 
which they would go to war, the basis for the post-war ‘battle of the memoirs’ from which many 
of the First World War’s controversies were generated. Working from Clausewitz’s warning about 
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the ‘encroachment’ of politics upon the military, Strachan demonstrated how the term ‘strategy’ 
was understood differently by military leaders prior to the war, disconnecting the operational 
plans of armies from those of national, government-formulated policy. This led to a divergence 
between military means and political ends during the conflict, resulting in political leaders on 
both sides attempting – or not – to gain control over the higher direction of the war efforts of 
the belligerents as the fighting developed. France and Britain, under Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George respectively, were evidence of the former, Germany under Ludendorff and Hindenburg 
evidence of the latter. The increased co-ordination of the allied effort in 1918 presented a 
blueprint for an institutional framework that could, in future, combine the political, diplomatic 
and military discussions required for the generation of a convergent policy. 
The opening session on Friday focused upon the opportunities for the Central Powers to bring 
about a negotiated peace, with Roger Chickering (Georgetown) and Marvin Fried (London School 
of Economics) discussing Germany and Austria-Hungary respectively. Chickering concentrated 
upon four ‘moments’ in the course of the war which demonstrated the enormous political and 
strategic obstacles which prevailed on the German side to a negotiated resolution of the war. 
Starting with von Falkenhayn and Bethmann Hollweg’s dispute at the end of 1914, through the 
Bethmann Hollweg peace offer of December 1916, Chickering highlighted that both civil and 
military leaders erected barriers to peace negotiations in different periods, leading to a situation 
in which the idea of a compromise peace was unable to gain popular traction until after the 
military situation had deteriorated to beyond the point at which the enemy were likely to agree 
to a lenient settlement. Germany had entered the war with broad popular support as part of the 
‘moral bargain’ between the state and society. Following the heavy losses of the opening months 
a compromise peace was only politically acceptable when both sides could claim victory. The 
situation on the fighting fronts ensured that such circumstances did not arise. 
Whilst Chickering demonstrated that German political and military leaders were open to 
negotiations at differing periods in the conflict, Fried exposed the aggressive, expansionist and 
inflexible war aims which drove Austria-Hungary to continue fighting in the face of an increasingly 
bleak military situation. Unlike in Germany, successive Foreign Ministers retained the decision-
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making process for the civil authorities, and ultimately gambled the very existence of Austria-
Hungary upon the possibility of significant post-war increases in the power, prestige, influence 
and territory of the Empire within the Balkans. As Fried illustrated, Austria-Hungarian inflexibility 
– which continued until the domestic food situation became truly disastrous – was a source of 
great opposition between Austria-Hungary and her coalition partners, and was a significant factor 
in prolonging the war. By continuing to fight on, Austria-Hungary prevented the isolation of 
Germany and further increased the probability that final defeat would result in the demise and 
dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy itself. 
The collapse of a monarchy was also the focus of Boris Kolonitskii’s (St. Petersburg) paper, the 
first of Friday’s second session. Kolonitskii discussed the role of public opinion in influencing the 
strategies adopted by Russia’s civil and military elite during the war. The ‘democratization’ of the 
Tsar’s image (wearing military uniform, visiting the front line and munitions factories) was met 
with an ambivalent reaction within Russia itself, an ambivalence also noticeable within the 
motives of those behind the February Revolution of 1917. Some of those involved wanted a 
revolution in order to stop the war, others wished to depose the Tsar in order to continue the 
war in a more efficient manner. It was this government, composed of actors with very different 
attitudes to the war, which supplied the back drop to Russia’s offensive of July 1917. The 
offensive was ‘sold’ to the soldier’s committees by the Socialist Revolutionary Minister for War 
and ‘persuader-in-chief’ Alexander Kerensky; it was a suicidal action for such a poorly equipped 
and morally bereft force. However, as Kolonitskii emphasized, the soldiers did vote for the 
offensive, and they did take part, further evidence that public opinion continued to play a vital 
role in the military strategy pursued by Russia until their final exit from the conflict. 
Rather than focus upon offensive action, in the second paper of the session Dušan Bataković 
(Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences) presented the military strategy of Serbia in the opening 
month of the conflict as purely defensive, a corollary of Serbia’s losses in the Balkan Wars and 
lack of preparation for fighting a major campaign in August 1914. Bataković sought to explain 
Serbian war aims within the context of Serbian-Austria-Hungarian relations in the decades prior 
to the outbreak of war. To Serbians, the Dual Monarchy represented a colonial ruler, with 
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discriminatory attitudes towards the Serbs. The Serbs on the other hand, led by the enigmatic 
Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, were committed to democracy and, following the military successes 
of 1914, the unification of Serbia with the South Slavs from the Yugoslav provinces of Austria-
Hungary. This policy would bring Serbia into conflict with Italy, they themselves having territorial 
ambitions in the Adriatic, but would be maintained in spite of the crushing defeat of the Serbian 
Army by the combined might of the German, Austria-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces in 
November 1915. As with their ‘colonial rulers’, Serbian war aims were consistent and inflexible. 
Compromise was not an option for either side, leading to the war of mutual extinction that would 
both cause great suffering to the peoples of Serbia and Austria-Hungary and, eventually, destroy 
the Dual Monarchy, bringing about the creation of the Yugoslav state that Prašić had demanded 
in the opening months of the war. 
Focus remained in the Balkans for the first paper of Friday’s session, as Oliver Schulz (Paris) 
discussed the subject of Bulgaria’s war aims. As with Serbia, for Bulgaria the First World War was 
not viewed as an isolated conflict, but rather as a continuation of the Balkan Wars. Nationalist 
tendencies prevalent in Sofia in the aftermath of the Second Balkan War influenced Bulgaria’s 
territorial ambitions, a return to the borders of Bulgaria as defined by the Treaty of San Stefano 
in 1878. Using these guidelines as a ‘bargaining tool’, the Bulgarian Prime Minister aimed to play 
off both the Entente and the Central Powers in order to maximize Bulgarian gains, preferably 
without fighting. The key location was Macedonia. The Central Powers could offer Bulgaria full 
control, the Entente – due to Serbian claims on the area – could not. Atrocities towards the 
civilian population of the enemy were a common feature of the fighting, itself a legacy of the 
Balkan Wars, and irregular units had operated on the Serbian-Bulgarian borderland both prior to 
Bulgaria’s official entry into the war and after the war had ended. Within this environment, 
German strategic influence was limited. Bulgarian commanders questioned and delayed the 
implementation of Mackensen’s plans, whilst the removal of resources for German and Austria-
Hungarian use led to great resentment among Bulgarian troops. Clearly, from Schulz’s paper, 
problems of coalition warfare were common to both sides and suggest a new appreciation of 
inter-allied relationships is necessary 
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John Gooch’s (Leeds) paper also assessed the aims and strategy of a ‘latecomer’, in this case Italy. 
As in Bulgaria, Gooch demonstrated that the Italian political situation at the outbreak of war 
played a pivotal role in Italy’s war aims, in the decision to join the Entente and, crucially, in the 
military strategy pursued by the military upon entry. Just three people were responsible for 
Italian policy: the Prime Minister Antonio Salandra, the Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, and King 
Vittorio Emanuele III. Strategy on the other hand, was solely under the control of Luigi Cadorna. 
The Italians expected to fight a war which would enhance Italy’s position and weaken that of 
Austria-Hungary. Following their entry however, Italy became increasingly involved in a ‘total’ 
war fought for limited ends. A lack of political unity and military alternatives to Cadorna led to 
successive operations on the Isonzo, resulting in a failure to break the deadlock and culminating 
in the disaster of Caporetto in November 1917. Not only did Caporetto lead to the removal of 
Cadorna and the promotion of the cautious Armando Diaz, but also to the creation of the 
Supreme War Council and an attempt at increased military co-operation and unified strategy 
within the Entente during 1918. Despite Diaz’s victory at Vittorio Veneto however, the changing 
nature of the ‘diplomatic game’ over the previous three years of intense war had created an 
international environment in which the aims Italy had desired at the outset were no longer 
attainable. 
But were Italy’s, or indeed any of the belligerents’, war aims really all that important? This was 
the central question addressed by Lothar Höbelt’s (Vienna) paper which concluded the Friday 
session of the conference. Taking as his starting the point the post-war polemic against 
imperialist, expansionist war aims, Höbelt illustrated that, when compared to the wars of 
unification in the nineteenth century, the war aims pursued in the First World War were actually 
very moderate. Compared to the ambitions of Napoleon before, and Hitler after, the Great 
Powers barely re-drew the European map in the aftermath of the war. Furthermore, war aims 
‘wobbled about’ in the endless friction of international relations, internal struggles and changes 
in public attitudes as the war developed. Therefore, Höbelt argued, the concentration on post-
war considerations of war aims tell only part of the story: war aims were far more important 
during the war as an influence on the means to bring about the desired end, rather than after 
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the war, when the debate over war aims led to a perception of the war’s outcome that was vastly 
different to the reality. 
The final session of the conference saw Klaus Schwabe (Aachen) and Mesut Uyar (New South 
Wales) present on the topics of the United States and the Ottoman Empire respectively. 
Schwabe’s paper focused upon the role of Woodrow Wilson, both as Commander-in-Chief of the 
US Army and as America’s political decision maker. Wilson’s belief in the power of democracy to 
promote a peaceful international system after the war led to a requirement for the autocratic 
monarchies of the Central Powers to be removed, either by military force or domestic agitation. 
Therefore, the policy of ‘regime change’ in Germany was both an aim and consistent rationale 
behind American actions in the war, culminating in Wilson’s refusal to recognize Prince 
Maximilian of Baden as the legitimate German leader in October 1918. Wilson’s demand for 
democracy – defined as a government that the people would like and would defend – led to the 
prolongation of the conflict as, until the final weeks of the war, there was not a significant enough 
anti-government movement within Germany to engender the change Wilson requested. 
Uyar’s paper, the final paper of the conference, returned to the theme of coalition with regard 
to the subordination of the Ottoman Empire to German influence, not least in the roles of 
Generals von Schellendorf and von Seeckt as German chiefs of the Ottoman General Staff. Both 
played a key role in the formulation and application of Ottoman military strategy during the war, 
yet their contribution has been overshadowed by concentration on the towering figures of Enver 
Pasha, Liman von Sanders and Erich von Falkenhayn. Uyar demonstrated how Turkish troops 
benefited from training in German tactical methods, particular in the 1920s, but at the same time 
found their limited resources eroded by the failure of German-led expeditions towards 
Afghanistan and Iran. As an agricultural economy, the Ottoman Empire was not geared towards 
the particular requirements of industrial warfare, however, as Uyar demonstrated, the Turks 
were able to sacrifice territory for time during the conflict and – as highlighted by Ottoman-
German friction over Georgia – the relationship between the two allies was not as prescriptive 
as has previously been considered. 
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Following a stimulating and exhaustive set of papers, Afflerbach offered a summary of the 
conference, highlighting the key factors to be considered in the volume to be created from the 
presentations. Each nation claimed that they needed their war aims to be met to justify the 
sacrifices being made across various fronts, the existence of coalitions with differing aims and 
the ambivalent, difficult to assess nature of ‘public support’ for the war added a further level of 
resistance to a compromise peace. It was this combination of deep and complex political 
problems that led to the continuation of the conflict, the easiest way out of the chaos was to 
fight on until victory. The only way to pay for the ‘financial catastrophe’ was to win on the 
battlefield and pass on the bill to the defeated. The ‘hard line’ approaches of those seeking total 
victory – Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Ludendorff the key figures – reinforced the stance of 
their opponents and helped refuel increasingly weary nations, the fear of defeat and submission 
to the enemy was a significant galvanizing tool. 
The outcome of the conference is to be a collection of essays based upon the topics addressed 
by each of the speakers, edited by Afflerbach under the title The Purpose of War. War Aims and 
Strategy during the Great War (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014). As the breadth of the papers 
summarized above illustrates, the collection will be a comprehensive, transnational volume 
seeking to understand how the belligerents constructed aims and the extent to which the military 
strategies they adopted were connected to those political aims and the limitations of coalition 
warfare requiring the assistance of separate sovereign nations each with their own, sometimes 
contradictory aims. However, as recognized in the discussion between delegates and 
contributors, the presented papers had seen somewhat more significant analysis of aims rather 
than strategies. The contributors agreed to rectify this imbalance for the published volume. 
If they are able to do so, then there can be little doubt that the forthcoming volume will supply 
an important and necessary contribution to the ongoing debate over civil-military relations 
during the First World War. 
